

Message Text

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ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-07 SP-03 SS-20 RSC-01 AID-20

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NSAE-00 DODE-00 EB-11 EUR-25 DRC-01 L-03 /134 W

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R 171318Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1093

INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ADDIS 11137

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, ET, US

SUBJECT: GENERAL AMAN'S COMMENTS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

REF: ADDIS ABABA 10815

1. SUMMARY. IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH CHARGE' ON SEPTEMBER 10, GENERAL AMAN ASSERTED THAT THE ETHIOPIAN AIR FORCE NEEDS THE AIM 9-E. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE WISHES TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS OPERATING IN ETHIOPIA. WE BELIEVE THAT THE AIM 9-E ISSUE NEED NOT BE ADDRESSED UNTIL WE HAVE CLARIFIED IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WHETHER THE AIR FORCE REALLY WANTS IT. GENERAL AMAN'S REQUEST FOR AUGMENTED ADVISORY STAFF POSES A DIFFICULT POLICY DECISION, HOWEVER. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS, AN INCREASED MAAG ADVISORY EFFORT WOULD ACTUALLY BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. FROM A POLITICAL STANDPOINT, HOWEVER, AUGMENTATION OF THE MAAG STAFF COULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE HELP IN CONVINCING THE ARMED FORCES AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN US/ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS THAT THE USG SOLIDLY SUPPORTS THE NEW "ETHIOPIA FIRST" REGIME. WHILE CHMAAG WOULD PREFER THAT GENERAL AMAN BE GIVEN A FLAT NEGATIVE ANSWER, THE EMBASSY WOULD PREFER A REPLY WHICH ATTEMPTS TO DISSUADE GENERAL AMAN BUT EXPRESSES WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE FURTHER IF HE STILL WISHES TO PURSUE IT AND WILL PROVIDE MORE PRECISE INFORMATION REGARDING HIS REQUEST. END SUMMARY.

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2. CONCERNING THE SIDEWINDER AIM 9-E, THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED:

A. WHILE ELEMENTS OF THE USMAAG HAVE HAD GENERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS BOTH HERE AND IN WASHINGTON ABOUT THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE AIM 9-B VERSUS THE AIM 9-E OR AIM 9-J, NO SERIOUS CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO PROCURING THE LATTER MODELS BECAUSE OF:

(1) THE UNCERTAINTY CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY OF THE AIM 9-E OR AIM 9-J.

(2) THE LEAD TIMES INVOLVED.

(3) THE LARGE INCREASE IN COST OF THE ADVANCED MISSILE.

(4) THE LARGE INCREASE IN COST TO MODIFY AIRCRAFT TO ACCEPT THE ADVANCED MISSILE.

(5) THE FLEXIBILITY OBTAINED WITH THE AIM 9-B MISSILE THROUGH POSSIBILITY OF UPGRADING IT LATER THROUGH RELATIVELY SIMPLE (BUT COSTLY) MODIFICATION.

B. WHILE THIS WAS THE ONLY MATERIEL ITEM GENERAL AMAN DISCUSSED WITH ME, CHMAAG HAD PREVIOUSLY ADVISED ME THAT, IN A DISCUSSION ON 7 SEPTEMBER, GENERAL AMAN STARTLED HIM BY STATING THAT THE IEAF WAS REEVALUATING ITS TOTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FUTURE BECAUSE ITS CURRENT ANALYSIS IS THAT THE PROPOSED F5A/F5E/SIDE-WINDER AIM 9-B PROCUREMENTS WILL NOT SATISFACTORILY MEET THE MIG-21 THREAT OF SOMALIA. CHMAAG SURMISES THAT THIS REEVALUATION WILL PROBABLY AGAIN RESULT IN THE IEAF WANTING THE F4. CHMAAG FURTHER ADVISED THAT, ON 7 SEPTEMBER, GENERAL AMAN CATEGORICALLY STATED THAT HE INTENDED TO MECHANIZE THE ENTIRE 3D ARMY DIVISION AND PROVIDE SUFFICIENT HELICOPTER SUPPORT TO THE IEGF TO LIFT TWO RIFLE COMPANIES. SUCH FORCE STRUCTURE OBJECTIVES ARE CLEARLY BEYOND THE SCOPE OF CURRENT US SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS, AND GENERAL AMAN KNOWS IT. IN FACT, NOT ONLY ARE THEY BEYOND OUR SHORT TERM COMMITMENTS; THEY ARE CLEARLY BEYOND THE TOTAL FORCE OBJECTIVES CHMAAG POSTULATED FOR 1980 IN HIS RECENT JSOP SUBMISSION.

C. THE FACT THAT GENERAL AMAN IS NOT CONSTRAINING HIS DEVELOPMENT OF IMMEDIATE FORCE STRUCTURE OBJECTIVES IN LINE WITH THE LIMITS SET BY CURRENT US SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS (GRANT/FMS CASH/FMS CREDIT) SUGGESTS THAT HE IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE FOREIGN SOURCES OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

D. ALL INDICATIONS TO CHMAAG ARE THAT GENERAL AMAN'S STATEMENTS ABOUT THE AIM 9-E ONLY REFLECT TENTATIVE REPEAT TENTATIVE CONCERNS OF SOME ELEMENTS OF THE IEAF. CHMAAG BELIEVES THAT A FORTHCOMING FORMAL REEVALUATION OF IEAF REQUIREMENTS WHICH GENERAL

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AMAN PLANS TO DIRECT MAY CONFIRM THE DESIRE OF THE IEAF FOR THE AIM 9-E. HOWEVER, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE MOD STAFF WILL CONTINUE TO OPT FOR THE AIM 9-B. CHMAAG FEELS THAT, INASMUCH AS THIS REEVALUATION WILL PROBABLY RAISE NUMEROUS OTHER ISSUES IN ADDITION TO THAT CONCERNING THE MISSILE, DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH MOD REPRESENTATIVES ON THE SUBJECT SHOULD AWAIT A DETERMINATION OF THE FINAL TOTAL IEAF/MOD FINDINGS. ONLY THEN CAN ISSUES CONCERNING THE AIM MISSILE BE PROPERLY EVALUATED AND DISCUSSED COMPARATIVELY

WITHIN THE TOTAL LIMITS OF THE US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

3. AS FOR THE ISSUE OF ADDITIONAL MAAG PERSONNEL, IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR JUST WHAT GENERAL AMAN HAS IN MIND. IN EARLIER DISCUSSIONS WITH CHMAAG HE INDICATED THAT HE WANTED A LARGE US MOBILE TRAINING TEAM (MTT) TO HELP HIM PEAK OFF TRAINING OF THE IEGF BY 30 JUNE 1975, THE TARGET DATE HE HAS SET TO BE READY FOR A SOMALI ATTACK. HE TOLD CHMAAG HE WANTED THE MTT'S TO GO DOWN INTO HIS IEGF BATTALIONS TO HELP WITH THEIR TRAINING. IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH ME, HOWEVER, HE SPOKE OF THE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AS PROVIDING ADVISORY ASSISTANCE "AT DIVISION AND HIGH LEVELS" REGARDING THE PROPER PERFORMANCE OF OFFICERS' FUNCTIONS.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1094

INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ADDIS ABABA 11137

4. SINCE ASSUMING COMMAND, GENERAL AMAN HAS REPEATEDLY ASKED CHMAAG TO PROVIDE USMAAG PERSONNEL FULL TIME FOR REORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL STUDY PROJECTS. IN SHORT, GENERAL AMAN WANTS THE USMAAG TO DO THE WORK OF THE IEMF FOR IT, AS IT DID YEARS AGO. CHMAAG HAS REITERATED THAT, WHILE HE WILL PROVIDE ADVICE AND IN-PROGRESS REVIEWS TO STUDY EFFORTS, THE IEMF HAS AMPLE EXPERTISE TO DO THE WORK ITSELF.

5. DURING HIS PREVIOUS ARMY SERVICE, GENERAL AMAN WAS THE IEMF LIAISON OFFICER TO THE USMAAG. HE TALKS OFTEN OF THOSE DAYS AND LIKES TO RECALL HOW LARGE THE USMAAG WAS THEN, HOW INVOLVED IT WAS IN TRAINING AT ALL LEVELS, AND HOW IT PROVIDED THE LARGE

OMNIBUS DELTA MTT IN 1965-1966. WHILE THE ONGOING 40 PERCENT REDUCTION IN THE USMAAG AND DELETION OF ITS ADVISORY CHARTER BELOW NATIONAL LEVEL HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED EXPLICITLY WITH GENERAL AMAN, HE IS OBVIOUSLY AWARE OF THE TREND AND IS APPARENTLY TRYING TO REVERSE IT WITH AN INCREASE IN THE ADVISORY EFFORT WHICH WILL RESTORE THE LEVEL OF DIRECT USMAAG INVOLVEMENT TO THAT OF THE "GOOD OLD DAYS", WHICH HE REMEMBERS.

6. WHEN CHMAAG ADVISES GENERAL AMAN THAT THE IEMF HAS THE CAPABILITY OF PROVIDING MTT'S TO OVERWATCH HIS PROPOSED TRAINING EFFORT, HE COUNTERS BY STATING THAT THE PRESENCE OF A US MTT WOULD HAVE GREATER "PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE" IN RAISING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE IEMF. NEVERTHELESS, ELEMENTS OF THE USMAAG ARE CONFIDENTIAL

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CURRENTLY ASSISTING THE IEGF TO IDENTIFY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL TO BE UTILIZED AS MEMBERS OF IEGF MTT'S.

7. WHILE CHMAAG REALIZES THAT THE PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL ADVISORS MIGHT HAVE POLITICAL VALUE IN THE CURRENT SCENARIO, HE STRONGLY FEELS THAT IN A STRICTLY MILITARY SENSE IT WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE VALUE BECAUSE:

(A) THERE IS ABUNDANT EVIDENCE THAT RESULTS OF THE DELTA TEAM OF 1965-66 HAVE HAD GROSSLY INADEQUATE IEMF FOLLOW-UP SINCE THE TEAM'S DEPARTURE.

(B) THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR SUCH AN INCREASE IN ADVISORS IN ETHIOPIA EXCEPT ON A TEMPORARY BASIS TO SUGGEST THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW EQUIPMENT; ANY GENERAL TRAINING EFFORT IS WELL WITHIN THE CAPABILITY OF THE IEMF.

(C) PROVISION OF MORE ADVISORS WOULD BE REGRESSIVE AND COUNTER TO THE MAAG PHILOSOPHY OF MAKING THE IEMF AS INDEPENDENT OF ADVISORY ASSISTANCE AS POSSIBLE; IT WOULD ONLY REINFORCE THE LONG-STANDING IEMF MENTALITY OF LETTING THE USMAAG DO THEIR WORK FOR THEM.

(D) ADDITIONAL ADVISORS COULD BE PROVIDED ONLY AS A USMAAG ADD-ON CHARGED TO MAAG SUPPORT COSTS, AS AN MTT CHARGED TO THE TRAINING PORTION OF THE CURRENT MAP, OR AS AN MTT DEVELOPED AS AN FMS CASE. TO RESORT TO MAAG SUPPORT COSTS WOULD CONTRAVENE EXISTING POLICY REGARDING THE REDUCTION OF MAAGS IN ETHIOPIA AND ELSEWHERE. TO CHARGE COSTS TO THE TRAINING SECTION OF THE MAP OR TO FMS AND TO DELETE NEEDED MILITARY TRAINING AND/OR EQUIPMENT OF EQUIVALENT COST WOULD BE UNJUSTIFIABLE IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF REAL NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ADVISORY PERSONNEL.

8. THERE ARE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF COURSE WHICH ARGUE IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. US RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA ARE IN A PARTICULARLY DELICATE PERIOD AT PRESENT AND THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY OF A SWITCH TO ANOTHER PRINCIPAL ARMS SUPPLIER AND A CONSEQUENT REORIENTATION OF ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY. THE LEVEL OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS THE CRITICAL FACTOR IN US-ETHIOPIAN

RELATIONS AT PRESENT AND IT IS CLEAR THAT THE US CANNOT PROVIDE NEARLY AS MUCH ASSISTANCE AS THE ETHIOPIAN MILITARY WANT. IT IS PROBABLE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF MAAG ADVISORY PERSONNEL WOULD PARTIALLY OFFSET ETHIOPIAN UNHAPPINESS REGARDING HARDWARE AND THEREBY MAKE A HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE ETHIOPIAN ARMED FORCES TOWARDS THE US.
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GENERAL AMAN IS LIKELY TO PLAY AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT ROLE IN RELATION TO ETHIOPIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE US AND HIS STRONGLY HELD VIEW THAT THE US ADVISORY EFFORT SHOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED CANNOT THEREFORE BE LIGHTLY DISMISSED.

9. BOTH MAAG AND THE EMBASSY BELIEVE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE CHARGE' TO INFORM GENERAL AMAN IN WRITING AND IN SOME DETAIL JUST WHY WE ARE CONVINCED THAT AN EXPANSION OF MAAG ADVISORY PERSONNEL AT THIS TIME WOULD WEAKEN RATHER THAN STRENGTHEN THE ETHIOPIAN ARMED FORCES. CHMAAG BELIEVES THAT SUCH A LETTER SHOULD CONSTITUTE A POLITE BUT COMPLETE REJECTION OF GENERAL AMAN'S REQUEST. THE EMBASSY CONSIDERS, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHOULD CONCLUDE SUCH A LETTER BY SAYING THAT IF GENERAL AMAN NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRECEDING COMMENTS STILL CONSIDERS IT HIGHLY IMPORTANT TO AUGMENT THE NUMBER OF MAAG ADVISORY PERSONNEL, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR HIM TO PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION REGARDING HIS PROPOSAL BEFORE IT CAN BE GIVEN FURTHER CONSIDERATION.

10. INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS ISSUE ARE REQUESTED.
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